ANOTHER BLOT AFTER ALASKA

For 6 years, the executive and representative brunches of power at different levels, from the former Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the now State Duma and the Russian Federation Council, have analyzed in detail the Agreement between the USSR and the U.S. on the sea demarcation lines between the states, signed on June 1, 1990, in Washington. They focus the analysis on the compatibility of the Agreement with the current Russian national interests. In the past, the People's Deputies of the USSR, and then the Russian Federation Deputies were unable to arrive to a unanimous conclusion. So the Agreement 1990 was not ratified.

In the meantime, the U.S. ratified the Agreement as early as September 16, 1991, where the Senate endorsed it with a pro vote of 86 to 6. According to the Washington Post dated September 17, 1991, Defending the Agreement the U.S. Department of State pointed out that 70 % of the Bering Sea will be under the U.S. jurisdiction, which will provide for 13,200 square kilometers more area, than if the demarcation line were drawn equal distance from each shore.

The State Duma and the Russian Federation Council of the last calling, having repeatedly heard in their 1995 sittings the issue of the 1990 Agreement, recommended the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to submit it for ratification.

At the same time the discussion of the 1990 Agreement, both in the Upper and Lower Chambers of the Russian Parliament has shown that the ratification is not likely to happen, even if the President does submit the Agreement. The obvious reason for this is infringement on Russian fishing interests following the adoption and provisional application of the Agreement already for 6 years.

Before 1867 the Bering Sea was internal Russian sea, as it was surrounded by Russian coastline on all sides--Chukotka and Kamchatka from the West, Alaska and Aleutian Islands from the West and South. Those lands belonged to Russia in those times.

In 1867, during the reign of Alexander II, the territory of Alaska and the Aleutians, as well as other territories of our North American colonies were sold to the United States of America for a laughable amount--7.2 million dollars. The purchase was validated in a corresponding Convention of March 18 (30), 1867, ratified by Russia and the United States of America in May of 1867. The Convention mentions only the concession of the territories by Russia. There was not a word about the sea demarcation in those times. The testimony of this statement is the original text of the Convention, containing only information about the concession of Alaska by Russia. All clauses do mention only territories. Besides, the International Law of that period did not operate such notions like "200 mile exclusive economic zones". Without doubt, the 1867 Convention was the worst strategic mistake of Russian politicians of the past, but what was done was done.

It seemed that Russian contemporary politicians would learn from the past mistakes and would not permit any other mistakes after the effect of the Alaska Syndrome. However, much as they tried to make the best of it, it turned out, as always did, the other way round... To make it worse even, the chain of mistakes grew longer and longer. Thus, in 1976--77 200 mile fishing, and afterwards, exclusive economic zones were introduced by countries all over the world. It concerned the Far Eastern seas as well. The USSR and the USA introduced 200 mile zones on March 1, 1977. As a result the necessity appeared to effect delimitation of 200 mile zones between the USSR and the USA in the regions where they overlap, that is where the distance between the shores of the neighboring states was less than 400 miles. As it turned out, such regions are rather extensive, about 1,500 nautical miles long. So, this border line is one of the longest fishing borders between two neighboring states.

The United States suggested to take the line adopted by the 1867 Convention (not existing in the Bering Sea, but in the Arctic Ocean) as a base for the solution of the delimitation matters with the 200 mile fishing zones (established in 1977) along the overlapped areas and forwarded to the USSR a corresponding proposal. After a long consideration by various departments, the Soviet leadership headed by Leonid Brezhnev, took a political decision to accept the proposal in principle, and in February 1977 addressed the United States to that effect. On February 24, 1977, on advise of fishing organizations the following statement was made:

"In connection with the U.S. Fish Resources Preservation and Management Act, taking effect March 1 this year, as well as the USSR Supreme Soviet's Decree on Provisional Measures for Preservation of Marine Resources and Fishing Management in the USSR Maritime Regions, when delimiting the sea borders with the USA along the 1867 Convention line, the American fishing zone will include the area located in the central part of the Bering Sea basin within the following coordinates: 58^o51'N--178^o50'W, 61^o45'N--176^o30'W, 60^o00'N--179^o40'W. In this section the fishing fleet of the USSR lands about 150,000 tons of fish, including pollock--100,000 tons, herring--30,000 tons, cod--5,000 tons, halibut--5,000 tons, flounder--3,000 tons.

Having in mind the aforesaid, the Soviet side expects that the American side, when allocating the general fishing quota for Soviet fishing organizations, will take into account their potential loss of landings in the outlined area." So, the Soviet political leadership of 1977, for unknown for the general public reasons, having not entered any negotiations, started the transfer to the United States of the Bering Sea regions where our Far Eastern fishing fleet used to operate traditionally.

Thus, in 1977, even without negotiations, our former leaders gave away a very important fishing region. Though, at the same time, announced by the U.S. was an annual compensation of 150,000 tons in fish quotas. Initially, prior to 1981, the U.S. allocated fishing quotas in their zone of the Bering Sea, which was deemed as the said compensation. In the following years they stopped the allocation, due to the U.S. economic sanctions in connection with the hostilities in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, it was uncovered during negotiations that the sides have differing views as to where the delimitation line should be established. The Soviet side thought it should go along the loxodromos, while the American side drew it along the orthodromos. As a result of the different approach a dispute rose over a 15,000 square kilometers sea region, which in terms of fishing was very important for our fishing industry. In this regard, again, on request of fishing organizations and entities a gentlemen's agreement was reache d on joint fishing operations in the disputed areas. However, beginning June 1, 1990, this understanding was breached in view of the unexpected signing and immediate application of the 1990 Agreement. It followed the suite of the Shevarnadze-Bekker agreements of June 1990 during Michael Gorbachov's visit to Washington. Furthermore, per the final text of the 1990 Agreement, conceded to the U.S. was another section of the 200 mile zone. Resulting from this, the economic zone of the U.S. in some regions surpassed the limits established by the International Law by 50 miles, while our zone was diminished by the same 50 miles. Again, our fishermen found themselves at a loss. According to the 1990 Agreement the American side received a considerable advantage in continental shelf areas of the central part of the Bering Sea. Its share here is made of over 46,000 square kilometers, while that of Russia is only 5,000. Time and again we are told that this is a deep-waters section, that the resources are not to be found here, and so on. If that is true, then all the more this part should be divided fairly: 50x50. Obviously, here lies some future interest.

The resulting figures look as follows. For the entire period from 1981 through 1996 Russian fishing companies lost a fishing area of more than 20,000 square kilometers, where annual landings can reach 150,000 tons of fish. Total for the 16 years is assessed at 2,400,000 tons valued at over 1,300,000,000 American dollars. Apart from that, Russian fisheries lost a fishing ground of its 200 mile zone with an area of 7,000 square kilometers, and also a part of the deep-water sections of the continental shelf fishing in the open Bering Sea, where discovery of live resources (shell-fish, crab, etc.) is possible in the future.

So far, there are no ardent supporters of an immediate ratification of the 1990 Agreement in the Russian Parliament. Its faults, harmful to Russia, are much too outspoken, first of all in the sphere of national economic interests, both in present and future. Fishing losses can be fully compensated only if American side exhibits understanding and good will. The easiest way out is to reach agreement on permitting the Russian fishing fleet to operate in the area that was annexed to the U.S. in February 1977. Of course, that should be done in full compliance with the U.S. fishing rules and regulations on fish resources preservation. The other is to agree on the transfer of the said region for the operations of Russian-American joint fishing ventures. Other variants may exist, including those concerned with the different forms of compensation.

Another issue requiring consideration is the restoration of the 200 mile economic zone of Russia in the part that, following the 1990 Agreement, was cut down, or its opening for the Russian fishing fleet. As far as the continental shelf in the high Bering sea, a series of ad hoc joint consultations are desirable. It is not ruled out, that a consent may be found on joint Russian American exploration, management and use of live resources in this region.

A number if international experts predict that Americans, given the political and economic weaknesses of Russia, are not likely to draw out for any additional agreements after the 1990 Agreement. Any agreement, wherein one side is taken advantage of, will sure act as a time-bomb, irrevocably leading to a confrontation. We can avoid the situation only through a joint Russian-American effort.