Logo of Northern Pacific



The Old Legacy and The Ways to Solve It

 

By Vyacheslav ZILANOV
and Aleksei PLOTNIKOV

 
"Kurils’ issue" — or, better to say, territorial claims of Japan for a group of southern islands of the Kuril Archipelago — is really "idea fixe" of the Japanese foreign policy toward Russia. One could make sure of it once more, having familiarized oneself with a comment of the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office spread by datapahts about resignation of Boris Yeltsin which, unlike comments of other countries, says about nothing but "hope to conclude peace treaty as soon as possible" i.e. satisfaction of Japan’s territorial claims to our country as official Tokyo understands it.
However, statements of the Japanese Prime Minister are true in ne — they sum up in a specific way relationship between Russia and Japan during the "Yeltsin period", which is finishing now. Exactly finishing but not finished yet, as "Yeltsin’s legacy" will obviously affect relations between the two countries for a long time, in spite of his declared retirement.
What are the results of development of relations with Japan during the "Yeltsin period"?
First of all it should be noted that Russian-Japanese relationship galvanized in many spheres. Just resent years have been marked by several summits "with and without ties" in Tokyo, Moscow, Kavane and privately in Krasnoyarsk. Numerous meetings have been held at governmental level, first exchange of delegations from Ministries of Defense took place.
Finally, several intergovernmental documents were signed among which were the Tokyo and Moscow declarations of 1993 and 1998 and the "Agreement on some cooperation in fishing of the living resources of the sea", 1998.
Nevertheless, the core of the two-way relationship of the past was, no doubt, and is still the so-called "territorial issue"; that was reflected in the foregoing mutual Declarations, which proclaimed their task to conclude peace treaty mentioned above by 2000 to "…enter the 21st century as trustworthy and efficient partners".
The relationship was characterized by two periods being vividly marked in the approach of the Kremlin’s government to this issue: from readiness and intention to cede the southern Kuril Islands to Japan in the early 90-s to statements about firmness of the Russian sovereignty over the islands during the last two-three years.
What are the real not proclaimed results of Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the eastern "Japanese direction"? How well do they suit the task of territorial integrity of Russia in the Far East?
Analysis of the above documents witnesses to the fact that the actual state of affairs is not so perfect as it might seem.
More over, one comes to the conclusion that numerous official statements in reality only mask unattractive facts of an actual "drift" of the Kremlin’s position to satisfaction if not to encouragement of territorial claims of Japan.
But let us take it step by step.
 
We want to remind you of a position of the Soviet Union concerning territorial claims of Japan (to the southern islands of the Kuril chain making more than a half of the square of the archipelago and including two largest islands — Iturup and Kunashiri) which (position) up to the early 90-s was kept steadfast to the wording of the "territorial claims between the USSR and Japan are settled and secured by corresponding international agreements to be observed". This position was last officially expounded in 1989 ("Izvestiya" 04/24/1989) by USSR’s Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Rogachev (at present RF’s ambassador in China). The article basing on detailed analysis of facts and some documents shows that: a) priority of opening and developing of the southern Kurils belongs to Russia; b) when these islands were a part of Japan, it used them as a base for aggression toward neighboring countries, in particular to attack Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Soviet non-battleship boats during the Second World War, when a neutrality pack between Russia and Japan was in force; c) Japan as an aggressor state of the Second World War was deprived of a part of its territory including all Kuril islands as an act of punishment for that aggression by the resolution of the winner-countries; d) revise of the resolution means revise of results of World War II which is "…fraught with a potential risk of undesirable destructive elements". At the same time the Soviet Union proved its intention to develop cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual profit as well as to "secure post-war borderlines between Russia and Japan".
The problem seemed to be exhausted as conduct of Japan (signing of corresponding agreements in particular) meant de facto recognition of those borders by the country, and more over the both nations observed them. However the general weakening of the State machinery in the post-perestroika period and fierce opposition of M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin in their contend for power made foreign policy and "Kurils’ issue" in particular a weapon of this contend.
In their utmost effort to weaken USSR’s president’s position all-out, Yeltsin’s followers began to speak in support of proposal to cede or to sell the islands to Japan at the cost of US $ 20–50 billion. A "five-staged plan of settling territorial claims" became a specific result of those activities. That plan was proposed by Yeltsin without any sanctions or any agreement with the center during his visit to Japan in 1990. The plan consisted of: (1) the official recognition of the "problem", (2) demilitarization of the islands, (3) announcement of the territory as a zone of free enterprise, (4) signing of the peace treaty and establishing the "unified management" over these islands, and (5) search for complete decision of the issue by future generation of politicians.
Later, being the president of the RF, Yeltsin never removed his five-staged plan from the agenda as well as he never scored it for sound at the official level, though speaking about almost fourteen variants of solving the "Kurils’ problem".
While practical deeds of Yeltsin and executives at different levels witness to a momentous fact that this plan was steadily being carried out, though with some changes.
More over, that plan might have been and still may be a "secret" base of the Kremlin’s policy toward the so-called "Kurils’ problem".
At present we think that the plan has entered its penultimate fourth stage, namely, conclusion of the peace treaty, which should fix the common standpoint on this issue and confirm (right confirm, not establish) the existing Russian-Japanese border.
 
Recognition of existence of territorial claims of Japan (i.e. agreement to discuss these claims in the diplomatic language), first fixed in the Soviet-Japanese Dictum and signed by M. Gorbachev in 1991, was confirmed and reinforced by B. Yeltsin in the Tokyo declaration in 1993 (signed right after the shooting down of the RSFSR’s Supreme Soviet), and later in the Moscow declaration of 1998.
Analysis of these documents shows the first considerable concession of Japan on the so-called "problem of northern territories". The Tokyo Declaration says, in particular, that the parts "…held an effective negotiation on a question of territorial belonging of the islands of Iturup, Kunashiri, Shikotan, Habomai. The parts agree that further negotiation is necessary to conclude peace treaty as soon as possible by deciding the issue". We want to pay your attention to the wording: "of belonging", not "of territorial claims of Japan", as it had to be, as there is no problem of territorial belonging of the islands — they all belong to Russia — there is only a problem of territorial claims of Japan to these islands.
Besides, these islands have never been mentioned as a part of the territory of the Russian Federation, which is absolutely inadmissible in documents of such kind.
 
The same thing almost without changes is found in the Moscow Declaration "About constructive partnership between the RF and Japan" of the year 1998, where, in addition to this, a special emphasis is made for several times on necessity of the propagandistic Peace treaty by 2000.
It is propagandistic because, as it is well known, it ceased to have significance as all questions necessary for a normal development of the two-way relationship, including those about the borderline were already settled in the Declaration on resumption of diplomatic relations in 1956 and, as it has been said, nowadays Japan needs this Peace treaty only as a means to satisfy its territorial claims to the RF.
 
There is one more important point.
The Moscow Declaration provides a special Subcommittee on demarcation line within the Joined Russian-Japanese committee on the conclusion of the peace treaty. It is interesting to know what is it going to "demarcate" if Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states about inviolability of Russia’s sovereignty over the southern Kurils? — there is still no answer.
Finally, there is one more important fact related to the Tokyo and Moscow Declarations that constantly slips out of the memory of the Russian authorities, though it is no less important than the "recognition" itself.
The Dictum of 1991 as well as the Tokyo and Moscow Declarations recognizes the claim of Japan not to two islands — Habomai and Shikotan — but to four ones, including those of Kunashiri and Iturup, though the Joined Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 — to which Tokyo regularly refers as to the base for the development of the two-way relationship — says about probable transfer of the first two islands only (islands of the Small Kuril chain), and not a single word is said about Kunashiri or Iturup. It may happen only after Japan signs the peace treaty. Thus, basing on the Declaration of 1956 about claims of Japan the latter may refer exclusively to the islands of the Small Kuril chain and other two islands (the biggest in the archipelago) should never be mentioned.
 
Unlike similar documents of the past either Tokyo or Moscow Declarations have never been considered as intergovernmental agreements of such kind require, in the Supreme body of the Representatives — the Federal Assembly.
One may suppose that Yeltsin’s administration hasn’t done it deliberately, realizing that these documents having evident disadvantageous conditions for Russia will be violently criticized and have no chance to be approved by the Parliament.
Thus, the first stage of the five-staged plan was accomplished quickly and without any serious problems.
The second stage — demilitarization of the islands, which ran with no less success — followed right the first stage in 1994–1996. As a result of it there are actually only frontier posts and marine units in the Kurils at present. At the same time the opposing force of Japan in Hokkaido did not decrease but increased in number and it strengthened due to additional state-of-the-art armament.
Japan, in its turn, interpreted these events as a sign of Russia’s weak points and exerted unprecedented pressure on the part of Russia, having initiated the mass unauthorized calling of specially trained speedsters at Russia’s territorial waters near the southern Kurils with the alleged purpose of catching fish. A number of trespassing amounted annually to ten thousand. Under these circumstances the then-commander of the Federal Frontier Troops General A. Nikolayev got permission for the use of force up to commencing fire against trespassers that was never practiced in Soviet times.
 
The succession of these events threatened the whole five-staged plan of B. Yeltsin. Promptly diplomatic arrangements were made and negotiations to allow Japanese boats (as a matter of fact, poachers) of fishery in Russia’s territorial waters were held. There is no precedent for this in history! It means that one should trespass to have a right for fishery.
 
It is of no less importance and benefit for Japan that in the Tokyo and Moscow Declarations Russia compromised its principle of national security it had always firmly upheld; the main principle of developing international relations with any country, which must be observed in all cases without exception.
Thus in the Declaration of 1956 and the Russian-Japanese Dictum of 1991 the principle of national security was a basic one, then the Tokyo and Moscow Declarations have not a hint about it. A new term of legality was introduced instead of that principle, which each part can interpret it, of cause, as it wishes; that’s what Japan practices with the connivance of Russia’s officials.
As for the third stage, the basis for its fulfillment became: entrance of citizens of Japan to the Kurils without visa, negotiation of the above-mentioned agreement on fishery in 1998, Japan’s humanitarian help to inhabitants of the islands, appeal of Russia’s authorities to Japanese business circles to invest into the region.
 
The above Agreement on Fishery, which we’ll examine in detail, witnesses to that how far the Kremlin is in that direction.
The intergovernmental agreement on fishery signed by B. Nemtsov — once Deputy Chief of the Russian government — for three years is unique in its anti-Russian essence.
The most striking in it is Russia’s virtually stated renounce of sovereign rights in its territorial waters near the southern Kurils, i.e. in its territory.
This conclusion comes straight out of this Agreement, where the first clause says: "The parts provide cooperation to ensure fishing of living resources by Japanese fishing-boats at sea… near Iturup, Kunashiri, Shikotan, Habomai as well as living resource conservation and their reproduction in that area". It means that we cooperate with the state, fishing in our territorial waters (i.e. in our territory), but not allow it to fish at a certain cost, as it always happens in cases of a kind (and what is stated in the Agreement).
More over clauses one and two let us know that Japanese fishermen will fish without preliminary permission not in Russia’s territorial waters but in a nameless "sea area", which belongs to no one state and which state belonging is not mentioned. This policy — Russia’s virtual renounce of sovereign rights in its territorial waters near the southern Kurils in favor of Japanese fishermen — may lead to other states demanding for the same "privilege". And Russia will hardly have anything against it.
Had "fishermen"-officials from Ministry of Foreign Affairs any idea what consequences it may have, when they agreed to include such clauses in the Agreement and what were they guided by then? Does the present president (the ex is out of the question) — a constitutional guarantor of territorial integrity of Russia?
Then, the main document — the proper Agreement — does not stipulate supervision of the Japanese fishing-boats by Russian inspectors and frontier guard; it also says nothing about Japanese fishermen observing Russia’s laws and regulations.
In other words, Japan, as a state, undertakes no official obligation on this key item.
Meanwhile the analogous agreements of the past, in particular the Agreement on fishery of laminaria in the area of the Small Kurils chain, 1963 and 1981, precisely formulated that "Japanese fishermen catching laminaria …are obliged to observe laws, provisions and regulations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, being in force in that region" (it is given in bold by the authors). This important clause having been kept for thirty years now disappeared from the Agreement dated 21 February 1998.
 
As a result of such "diplomatic zagogulin" (wording and wrangling) we, practically, have an unprecedented case — and it should be emphasized — when citizens of Japan have an extra-territorial status to fish in our territorial waters — i.e. they can disobey Russia’s laws in its territorial sea — a discriminating status by jus gentium and inadmissible in international relationship.
In essence, it is nothing but a slow transfer of marine areas of Russia to Japan.
 
It is still not the end of the story.
The Russian geographic names are given along with the Japanese geographic names including those of capes in the "Memorandum of comprehension" to the Agreement (document providing basis for an annual "cooperation" between parties) for 1998 and 1999, and in the "Instructions on the marine living resources fishery procedure for the Japanese fishermen". How should we interpret it? Whether the Russian authors of the Agreement aren’t aware (the Japanese, no doubt, are) of geographic names being one of the most important constituents verifying sovereignty of a state over its territory; and a self-esteemed state will never allow foreign geographic names to appear in an international agreement to designate its territory even along with its own ones?
Such approach to the international agreement of Russia does not only violate the Law of the RF "About designation of geographic entities", stipulating the usage of single geographic names; but it also raises a question: do we own the southern Kurils jointly with Japan? Or do the islands still belong to Russia?
Again, no answer is given to the question.
 
The fact that foreign boats virtually disobeying Russia’s regulations fish in our territorial waters is of no less importance. It also opens a subject of territorial security and security of people living there. Security of Russia’s territory and security of the Russians.
The following document is given in the Moscow Declaration as an example of "fruitful cooperation", which is "deeply appreciated by the leaders of both countries"!
 
It is obvious that Japan has formulated legal clauses of unexampled benefit — clauses, it couldn’t have dreamed of — providing necessary legal base that severely "blurs" the Russian sovereignty over the southern Kurils; clauses setting a law precedent that will be later on used as a serious argument at negotiations or in case of necessity in the International Court of Justice. Again there will be nothing to be said against it.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov realizing, probably, vulnerability and unprofitableness of the situation for Russia considered it necessary to appease people having proclaimed that "he is aware of some caution about that agreement" ("Nezavisimaya Gazeta" (the Independent Newspaper), 02/23/1999). We dare to assure the minister of an urgent correction of errors, compromising National interests, but not of some caution.
 
"The acme" of the third stage of Yeltsin’s plan, besides the Agreement of 1998, was an idea of the "joined Russian-Japanese economic activity" in the southern Kurils advanced by E. Primakov when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. A Russian-Japanese subcommittee on the joined economic activity was set up to carry out that part of the plan. Although this subcommittee hasn’t produced any great results beneficial for inhabitants of the southern Kurils, we may state that the fourth stage of the plan has begun. Japan, however, is about to come across a stumbling block — the peace treaty which must be concluded after the "problem of territorial belonging of the islands is settled".
It is most difficult, since to talk about peace treaty 55 years after the Second World War seems at least absurd that either Russia’s MFA or the president and his administration are likely to understand. Therefore Russia’s authority have rejected the idea of the peace treaty for the first time during resent years, the idea proclaimed in the Declarations of the years 1993 and 1998 and advanced an idea of a wide-scale (comprehensive) "Treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation". This agreement is meant to define comprehensive approaches for the perspective Russian-Japanese cooperation in all spheres, deciding "the issue of a boundary placing" ("Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 02/23/1999). It is not quite clear what "boundary placing" means. If the speech is about "demarcation of boundaries", then there is still anxiety about Russia’s vicious course of indulging Japan’s territorial claims. In practice it will provoke nothing but more claims and make then more insistent.
It is true that Igor Ivanov reassures people of absolute inadmissibility of "Russia’s denounce of its sovereignty over the southern Kurils" in "the issue of the Agreement concerning demarcation of borders" and of it "…posing no threat to Russia’s sovereignty and integrity" ("Nezavisimaya Gazeta", 02/23/1999).
It implies that if this agreement is signed there will be the fifth stage of Yeltsin’s plan — the final decision of the territorial belonging of the islands will be taken by the next generation of politicians.
This generation has already come though — a new Duma and a new President have been elected and Boris Yeltsin has announced his "follower".
In this case it is natural to ask: "Whether the new State Duma and the "follower" are ready to accomplish the fifth-staged plan of the first president of the RF and how are they going to do it?"
We dare to say that in principle the answer is clear. It is based on a principle of the rigidity of territorial integrity of the country and immovability of its borders.
 
If the attitude of the new President of the RF Vladimir Putin to Japan’s territorial claims is clearly expressed in his repeated statements about the rigidity of territorial integrity of Russia and especially in his last statement in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (below), then the standpoint of major fractions of the State Duma (either second or third assembly) on the issue can be traced in the following statements:
The CPRF: "The Communist Party of the RF and its fraction in the Sate Duma establish its policy on the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity of our State and oppose attempts to change post-war borderlines no matter on what pretexts it may occur. This principle applies to the so-called "problem of the southern Kurils".

G.A. Zyuganov, S.P. Goryacheva
11/10/1999

 
The Agrarians: "World War II finished more than 50 years ago. There are no grounds to revise its results today, including the existing borders. Hence, the Agrarians do not allow the territorial claims of Japan to Russia".

N.M. Kharitonov
02/08/1999

 
"Yabloko": "The Yabloko fraction does not allow the territorial claims of Japan to Russia’s southern Kurils".

A.A. Arbatov
03/19/1999

 
"The OVR" (Our Home Is Russia): "The OVR fraction considers claims of Japan groundless and oppose transfer of these territories under jurisdiction of Japan".

A.P. Andreyev
06/11/1999

 
"Narodovlastiye" (Democracy): "There is no problem of "northern territories", there is a problem of groundless claims of Japan to the southern group of the Kuril Islands, which means nothing but Japan’s attempt to revise results of the Second World War"

N.I. Ryzhkov
03/19/1999

 
The LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia): "The LDPR fraction does not allow any territorial claims of Japan to Russia, including those to a group of southern islands of the Kuril archipelago".

V.V. Zhirinovsky
02/11/1999

"Russia’s Regions": "To my mind the best way to solve the problem of the Kuril Islands is, first of all, to stop any talks about the existence of this problem. The Kurils are an essential and a very important part of Russia. Secondly, it is necessary to provide conditions of maximum favor for the development of mutually beneficial economic relations between Russia and Japan in the region of the Kuril Islands".

O. Morozov
10/07/1999

 
"Unity": "— What is your attitude to the problem of the Kuril Islands? — Not a single inch".

S.K. Shoigu
10/29/1999

 
"People’s Deputy": "We do not allow territorial claims of Japan to the southern Kurils".

G.N. Raikov
03/29/2000

 
"Fatherland-All Russia": "— And still, is it possible to solve the problem of the Kurils till 2000? — We should ask those who promised to solve it by 2000".

Y.M. Luzhkov
06/25/1999

 
All these standpoints and statements show that all leading national political parties are unanimous in their attitude to the problem of Japan’s territorial claims and the executive power has to take it into account, especially on the threshold of the final stage of the five-staged plan and the year 2000 that has already come, which (the plan) was stated in the Declarations 1993 and 1998.
Although it is not still clear what deputies from the Union of Right-wing Forces, considering themselves "proputin’s young party" think. At the same time if we take into consideration the fact that their true not announced or elected leaders — Chubais and Co. — are getting patriots too, we may suppose the Union of Right-wing Forces will have to share the opinion of the majority too in spite of presence of Irina Khakamada.
The situation will become apparent if we add the statement of Vladimir Putin made in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on September 3, 1999, to the said above: "does anyone say that the government plans to cede the Kurils? We negotiate, we acknowledge the problem, but transfer of the Kurils is out of the question".
 
Well, what do we have in the end? We have realization of the "five-staged plan" of B. Yeltsin, three intergovernmental declarations recognizing the fact of territorial claims of Japan and "enlarging" them, the agreement on fishery which is not enjoying the equal rights and is not advantageous for the RF from the point of view of the law, as it severely blurs Russia’s sovereignty over the southern Kurils and also a … deadlock condition in the end.
It is deadlock because viewpoints of the parts are quite opposite, since the Russian Federation proclaims the rigidity of its sovereignty over the Kurils and Japan, as expected, demands transfer of a part of the islands, i.e. territorial concessions on the part of Russia.
Endless talks about the conclusion of "the peace treaty" or "the treaty of peace" any day now make no point as it is absolutely obvious that Japan never signs it without satisfaction of its territorial claims, since it makes no sense otherwise to sign it.
Thus it becomes evident that the only way out is to recognize by the two parts that the so-called "problem of territories" is a result of the Cold War and with its ending the parts remove it from the agenda of their own free will in order to develop long-term good-neighbor relations.
The sooner the Kremlin and Tokyo understand it, the quicker and more productive the development of the two-way relationship will be, not weighted with the non-existed "problem of territories", which was solved fifty years ago.
To avoid such situations — and not only with Japan — in the future, the state policy must be simple to the limit — it shouldn’t give Japan any advantage over other states on a mere basis that the Kurils are located near Japan and belonged to it some time ago.
Once we owned Alaska and now it belongs to the US, but it doesn’t mean that Russia has any advantage over other foreigners or gives any ground to demand "extra-territorial status" on the mentioned territories or in their territorial waters.
 
It mustn’t give any advantage or ground to Japan either.
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