THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PACIFIC FISHERIES THE BERING SEA TRANSBOUNDARY POLLOCK STOCKS

The pollock stock is a magnificent resource and centerpiece of North pacific fisheries. Worldwide, it was the second most important species after anchovy. United States and Russian fishing industries rely heavily on pollock. The Bering Sea provides a significant component of that pollock catch: 91% and 32% respectively of the U.S. and Russian harvests.

It should be no surprise then that pollock has become the focus of international attention. It is a resource worth managing, one worth managing well. And I believe we are at a threshold of several major policy decisions that will impact significantly the long term sustainability of the pollock resource. How we move forward from here may lead to conflict or to cooperation.

Two major international concerns confront us: (1) the straddling stock nature of the pollock resource in and around the Donut Hole, that portion of the central Bering Sea outside the fisheries jurisdiction of Russian or the United States; and (2) the transboundary nature of the pollock resource between Russia and the United States in the northern Bering Sea. The first concern arose because foreign vessels moved into the Donut Hole in the mid-1980s as they were displaced from U.S. waters by growth of our own industry. Pollock catch increased rapidly and then declined even more rapidly.

The moratorium on fishing since 1993 and the formula approach for future operations seem to have addressed the Donut Hole concern for the time being.

Today, I want to dwell on the second international concern of importance to the long term sustainability of the pollock resource: the transboundary nature of the northern Bering Sea pollock stocks. While it is well recognized that several countries benefit from, and have great interest in, Bering Sea pollock, the transboundary issue will need to be addressed mainly by just two nations: Russia and the United States. As is the case with other species throughout the world's oceans, pollock never became smart enough to recognize national boundaries.

Pollock migrating from the Eastern Bering Sea shelf intermingle with pollock stocks from the Western Bering Sea in the Cape Navarin region, where they are fished by the Russian fishing fleets and third party countries licensed by the Russian government. And there lies the basis for our international transboundary issue. But the pollock spend some part of their life cycle on the Russian side and are subjected to a second fishery. We have no control over the those harvests, and to make matters worse, until recently, we have not had a good idea of the magnitude of those harvests or what proportion were juvenile pollock from our side of the Bering Sea. Our fishermen are concerned about the juvenile mortality in the Western Bering Sea, and how it may be impacting the long term sustainability of this magnificent resource. In addition, environmentalists and managers worry about worry about the long term implications of any collapse in pollock stocks on other components of the Bering Sea ecosystem.

To help management, various attempts have been made to categorize stocks on the basis of their abundance cycles. The four main stock categories included (1) steady state fisheries as illustrated by North Sea turbot, (2) regular, periodic fluctuations such as for hake, (3) irregular fluctuations such as for juvenile herring off Norway, and (4) irregular, intermittent production such as for California sardine and anchovy. It is difficult to place Bering Sea pollock in a specific category. The stock is recruitment driven and it remains unclear which ecosystem factors produce a good year class. It is clear, however, that even if we do not know how pollock fluctuate over time, that they will fluctuate.

If and when the pollock stocks decline, the managers and scientists on our side inevitably will shake their heads, mention something about changes in the environment, and possibly even toss a little blame on the Russians, saying they overfished their side of the resource and got ours too. And the Russians may talk of environmental changes, and probably say that the Americans fished too hard and did not quite know how to manage the fisheries.

Why get to this point? We now have the opportunity to work together, to cooperate, rather than react to crisis and conflict. Why should we, Russia and the united States, with all our scientific and technological resources, go down the same well-traveled paths so many other countries have traveled, where conflict between nations over resource access is placed ahead of cooperation to provide for the long term well-being of the resources. The time is ripe for cooperation to begin.

I am hopeful that eventually we will move toward more openness with each other and toward more compatible management regimes. Underpinning any future relationship between the United States and Russian Far East must be several principles:

Peer-reviewed scientific advice. Our scientists need to come to agreement on exploitation rates and status of the stocks. We need to exchange biological information, and scientists from both countries need to be able to review the same sets of data and give both sides consensus opinion if possible.

Conservative harvest levels. Managers should take a precautionary approach in setting annual harvest limits. Overfishing definitions need to be developed and then adhered to.

Verifiable reporting of catch. Both sides need to have confidence that the other is producing accurate catch data that reflect the amount of fish taken from the water. We have observers full time on fishing vessels over 125 feet long and 30% coverage on vessels 60 feet to 125 feet long. They are our source of verifiable catch information.

Compliance monitoring. There must be strict enforcement of regulations and quotas so that harvest levels are not exceeded.